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FIRST DO NO HARM: INTERPRETING THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION TO EXCLUDE HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
JOSHUA L. ROOT
ABSTRACT:
The yet to be implemented Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute
criminalizes, as the crime of aggression, acts of aggression which by
their “character, gravity and scale” constitute a “manifest violation” of
the Charter of the United Nations. This article argues that Article 8 bis
must be construed so as to exclude from the International Criminal
Court’s jurisdiction uses of force, which are facial violations of the UN
Charter, but which nonetheless comport with the principles and
purposes of the Charter, such as bona fide humanitarian intervention
unauthorized by the Security Council. This article examines and applies
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state practice, and
opinion juris to conclude that such humanitarian intervention is not a
use of force per se prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, despite
widespread belief to the contrary. Even if Article 2(4) prohibits bona
fide humanitarian interventions, humanitarian interventions will not
be—by their “character, gravity and scale”—“manifest” violations of
the UN Charter, and therefore are not crimes within the competency of
the International Criminal Court to punish.

Abstract:
Joshua L. Root is a Lieutenant J.G. in the U.S. Navy, JAG Corps. He is
licensed to practice law in Florida and is a returned Peace Corps
Volunteer (Cambodia 2007-2009). He has his J.D. from the University
of Florida and his L.L.M. from the University of Edinburgh in the UK.
He wrote this article in his own capacity. The views here are not
necessary the views of the U.S. Government.

63

Journal of International Law

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .................................................................... 65
II. Interpreting the UN Charter’s Prohibition of
the Use of Force.............................................................. 67
III. Manifest Violations of the UN Charter .......................... 80
A. Character .................................................................... 88
B. Gravity ....................................................................... 90
C. Scale ........................................................................... 94
IV. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege ............................................... 95
V. Conclusion ...................................................................... 97

64

Journal of International Law

More and more, we all confront difficult questions
about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by
their own government, or to stop a civil war whose
violence and suffering can engulf an entire region. I
believe that force can be justified on humanitarian
grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places
that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our
conscience and can lead to more costly intervention
later.
--President Barack Obama upon receipt of
the Nobel Peace Prize1

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 12, 2010, the States Parties to the International
Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) meeting in Kampala, Uganda
adopted by consensus a new Article 8 bis for the Rome Statute.2 Doing
so, they defined the crime of aggression for the purposes of the ICC’s
statute and addressed the Court’s future jurisdiction over that crime.3
Article 8 bis (1) defines “the crime of aggression” as:

1

Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture by Barack H. Obama: A Just and
Lasting Peace (Dec. 10, 2009), available at
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obamalecture_en.html.
2
See generally Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy of an International
Crime: Aggression at the International Criminal Court, 13 INT’L CRIM.
L. R 829 (2013).
3
See Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda, May 31-Jun. 11, 2010, U.N. Doc.
R/Con./Res.6 [hereinafter RC/Res.6]; see also Robert Heinsch, The
Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the
Future?, GOETTINGEN J. INT’L. L. 713, 715 (2010). Thirty member
States must ratify Article 8 bis and the Member States must take further
action after January 1, 2017 before the ICC can assert jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 8 bis, 15 bis(2-3), 15 ter, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002
[hereinafter Rome Statute].The decision by the Member States to
confer on the Court this jurisdiction must be taken by the same majority
which is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute. As
of this writing, only five states have now ratified the Article 8 bis
amendment. See UN Treaty Collection, 2013-04-11.
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[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or execution,
by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 4
Article 8 bis (2) defines “act of aggression” as, “the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”5 Article 8 then
specifies examples of acts of aggression.6 Undefined terms such as
“character,” “gravity,” “scale,” and “manifest” at first appear
ambiguous. Properly construed, however, these terms exclude bona fide
humanitarian intervention from the scope of the crime.7 Beth Van
Schaack has argued that:
The crime of aggression is expansively drafted in a
way that implicates all uses of force that might be
construed to constitute a ‘manifest’ violation of the
U.N. Charter . . . As a result, the codification of the
crime of aggression and the eventual threat of
prosecution may chill those uses of force that are
protective in nature, such as interventions pursuant to

4

Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8 bis(1).
Id. at art. 8 bis(2).
6
See id. at art. 8 bis(2)(a)-(g) (these acts include invasion,
bombardment, blockade, etc.)
7
See Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian
Intervention on Behalf of Women, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 477, 491
(2011). (“[S]ome elements that would be required for any valid
intervention . . . include: action by a legitimate authority; pursuit of a
right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil);
abuses that exceed some gravity threshold; the use of force as a last
resort after efforts at diplomacy, negotiation and other sanctions had
failed; a proportional response; and a reasonable prospect of success. In
terms of legitimate power, a prioritising of Security Council action, or
at a minimum multilateral or regional action, is a central feature of
modern theorising about humanitarian intervention . . . [a]n additional
requirement would be that such an intervention would result in the
diminution rather than escalation of violence.”).
5
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the nascent doctrine of responsibility to protect [and
humanitarian intervention.] 8
This article shows that a reading of Article 8 bis construing
humanitarian intervention as a crime before the ICC is unwarranted and
unwise. Part I of this article argues that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
should be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) in light of the UN Charter’s
human rights provisions, especially Articles 1, 55, 56, and the
Preamble.9 By doing so, it becomes tenable to interpret Article 2(4) so
as not to proscribe bona fide acts of humanitarian intervention per se.
Part II examines Article 8 bis and shows that excluding humanitarian
intervention from the crime of aggression is fully warranted by the
Rome Statue, and is even required by its terms. In order for a violation
of the UN Charter to be a crime under Article 8 bis it must be a
manifest violation.10 This threshold excludes uses of force, such as
humanitarian interventions, that may be facial violations of the UN
Charter, but which nonetheless comport with its principles.11 Further,
this article will show that the qualifiers “character” and “gravity” must
be construed so as to exclude humanitarian intervention from the crime
of aggression’s scope, thereby precluding humanitarian intervention
from being a manifest violation of the UN Charter. A discussion of
nullum crimen sine lege and a conclusion follows.

II.

INTERPRETING THE UN CHARTER’S PROHIBITION OF
THE USE OF FORCE

Humanitarian intervention is “the use of armed force for the
prevention or discontinuation of massive violations of human rights in
a foreign State.”12 The crime of aggression requires an act of aggression
8

Id. at 478-79.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art.
1, art. 55, art. 56.
10
See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part III.
12
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 130
(BRUNO SIMMA ed., 2nd ed., 2002) (citing Michael Reisman & Myres
S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 167-96,
178, 192-93 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); see Michael Reisman,
Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM
9

67

Journal of International Law

which in turn necessitates the use of force.13 Any discussion on the
legality of the use of force, including force used for humanitarian
purposes, begins with the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force
contained in Article 2(4); however, this must not end there. That article
provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 14 There are two provisions
where the UN Charter expressly authorizes the use of force despite
Article 2(4). The first is force used in self-defense (Article 51) and the
second is the use of force pursuant to a Security Council resolution
under its Chapter VII (Articles 43-48) powers.15 There is no provision
specifically addressing humanitarian intervention, and at first blush, the
two explicit exceptions appear to be the only lawful uses of force under
the UN Charter framework. Upon closer examination; however, it
becomes clear that not all other uses of force are per se prohibited by
Article 2(4) or any other provision.16 Unlike self-defense, the argument
INT’L. L. J. 794, 794-805 (1995); see Michael Reisman, Sovereignty
and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 866, 866-76 (1990); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 18 (J.L. Holzgrefe and
Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (defining humanitarian intervention as
“the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations
of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own
citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force
is applied.”); see also Gillett, supra note 2, at 851 quoting SEAN D.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 11-12 (1996) (defining humanitarian
intervention as “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or
international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the
nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of
internationally recognized human rights.”).
13
See generally Reisman & McDougal, supra note 12 at 192-93.
14
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
15
See id. arts. 39-51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . ”) Id. art. 51.
16
But see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE
72 (5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he Charter forbids the use of inter-State force,
except in the exercise of self-defence or as a measure of collective
security decided upon by the Security Council, [and] any professed
68
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here is not that humanitarian intervention is affirmatively authorized by
the UN Charter; rather, the argument is simply that humanitarian
intervention is not prohibited. Since states are free to engage in any
conduct they wish so long as it does not violate a proscription of
international law, that is all which must be proven.17
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, which is
customary international law, the UN Charter is a treaty and is thus
subject to the rules of treaty interpretation. 18 The Vienna Convention
provides that provisions of a statute should be interpreted with
“ordinary meaning . . . given to the term[s]” in the text. 19 The terms of
Article 2(4) seem clear enough, but as International Court of Justice
(ICJ or World Court) Judge Simma explained, “[t]he ordinary meaning
of a term can only be determined by looking at the context in which it
is used.”20 The ICJ emphasized this point in the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) advisory opinion.21 The
relevant context of Article 2(4) is that it is contained in the UN Charter,
itself a human rights document (drafted as the full magnitude of the

dispensation from this prohibition would be contradictory to the
Charter.”).
17
See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7), (“Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed.”).
18
VCLT, supra note 9, at art. 2(1)(a) (“‘[T]reaty’ means an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation”); see also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v.
Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 72 (May 23) (Where the ICJ applied the Vienna
Convention to the dispute, even though neither state party was a
member of the convention, because the convention reflects customary
international law; see also, Frequently Asked Questions About Vienna
Convention on Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm.
19
VCLT, supra note 9, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
20
SIMMA, supra note 12, at 20.
21
See Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion,
1960 I.C.J. 150, 158-60 (June 8).
69

Journal of International Law

Holocaust was coming to light), and must be read in that context.22
Human rights are expressly provided for in Articles 55 and 56. UN
Charter Article 55 states that “the United Nations shall promote . . .
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all . . . .” 23 Article 56 further provides that “[a]ll Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.”24
Further, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that
treaty provisions “shall [be interpreted in] light of [the treaty’s] object
and purpose.”25 This is a crucial point often missed by strict
constructionists. “Shall” indicates an imperative; it is not optional. 26
Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention then explains that the object
and purpose of a treaty are determined, inter alia, by looking at the
treaty’s preamble.27 The preamble of the UN Charter provides that its
members “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . .”28 In his
dissent to the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, ICJ Judge
Weeramantry noted that “dignity and worth of the human person” are
keynote principles of the UN Charter.29 More palpably, UN Charter
Article I reads: “The Purposes of the United Nations Are [the
achievement of] (3) “international co-operation in solving international
problems of . . . humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all . . . .”30

22

See Katarina Mansson, Reviving the ‘Spirit of San Francisco’: The
Lost Proposals on Human Rights, Justice and International Law to the
UN Charter, 6 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 217 (2007).
23
U.N. Charter art. 55.
24
U.N. Charter art. 56.
25
VCLT, supra note 9, at art. 31(1).
26
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the
verb “shall” as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to . . . This is
the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts
typically uphold.”).
27
VCLT, supra note 9, at art. 31(2).
28
U.N. Charter pmbl.
29
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 441-42 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry).
30
U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3.
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Pursuant to the Vienna Convention, the provisions of the UN
Charter (including Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force) must
be interpreted in conformity with the purposes of the UN Charter.
These purposes specifically include the promotion and protection of
human rights. Commentators support this position;31 additionally, so do
the terms within the UN Charter. It is important to note that Article 2(4)
speaks of conduct inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter, not
necessarily with the provisions of the Charter.32 Additionally, under the
doctrine of effet-utile when a treaty provision is subject to multiple
interpretations, “the one that best serves the recognizable purposes of
the treaty and its various provisions must be chosen.” 33 In his dissenting
opinion in the ICJ’s South-West Africa advisory opinion, Judge de
Visscher made it clear that this principle is applicable to the UN
Charter:
It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty
clauses must not only be considered as a whole, but
must also be interpreted as to avoid as much as
possible depriving one of them of practical effect for
the benefit of others. This rule is particularly
applicable to the interpretation of a text of a treaty of
a constitutional character like the United Nations
Charter.34
Article 2(4) cannot be interpreted to abrogate the very purposes of the
Charter, especially its human rights provisions, or to deprive Articles 1,
55, 56 and the Preamble of any meaning. Therefore, the article cannot
be construed to prohibit bona fide humanitarian intervention necessary

31

See e.g., Keith A. Petty. Criminalizing Force: Resolving the
Threshold Question for the Crime of Aggression in the Context of
Modern Conflict, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 105, 125 (2009); Michael
Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and
Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 78 (20072009).
32
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
33
See SIMMA, supra note 12, at 31.
34
International Status of Southwest Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950
I.C.J., 187 (July 11) (dissenting opinion of Judge De Visscher); see
also, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of The United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J.,174 (April 11).
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to enforce the principles of the Charter even if force is unauthorized by
the Security Council.
There is ample support for the position that a customary rule
of international law allowing for just uses of force under Article 2(4)
has emerged.35 The General Assembly carved out an exception for
aggression in Resolution 3314, when it defined aggression for the
purposes of assisting the Security Council in interpreting the UN
Charter.36 Although adopted by consensus, the General Assembly does
not legislate, and therefore Resolution 3314 is not binding on the
Security Council.37 However, the importance for this resolution cannot
be ignored. General Assembly resolutions can have great normative
effect and at a minimum, Resolution 3314 is expectation-forming and
evidence of opinio juris.38 Crucially, Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute
explicitly incorporates Resolution 3314 making it part of the governing
law of the ICC.39 Article 6 of Resolution 3314 states that “[n]othing in
this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or
diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions

35

See, e.g., Fernando R. Tesón, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 2, 42-48
(2009); Lee F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian
Intervention Doctrine: The ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 605-632 (2001).
36
See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3314].
37
See Yoram Dinstein, Aggression in THE MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed.,
2012).
38
See e.g., Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law
in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L. J. 876, (1983) (for more on how
General Assembly resolutions can create soft-law); Tullio Treves,
Customary International Law, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 937, 946 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012);
Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN
Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the
ICJ, 16 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. no. 5, 879, 879-906 (2005).
39
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 5 (stating, “Any of the following
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression . . . ”).
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concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”40 However, the
resolution also explains that its provisions on the definition of
aggression are “interrelated and each provision should be construed in
the context of the other provisions.” 41 Therefore, Article 6 must be read
alongside Article 7, which effectively endorses the use of force in
support of wars of national liberation and the right of selfdetermination.42 Article 7 of the consensus definition of aggression
states:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3
[giving examples of aggressive conduct, which has
been reproduced in Article 8 bis], could in any way
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and
independence, as derived from the Charter, of
peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . . in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes
or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and
receive support in accordance with the principles of
the Charter and in conformity with the abovementioned Declaration.43
The point here is that Resolution 3314—and therefore Article
8 bis—endorses a use of force, at least in some circumstances that are
not provided for in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) is not a shibboleth. As
reasoned by the General Assembly in the consensus definition of
aggression, there are times when the use of force not in self-defense,
and not under the aegis of the Security Council, may nevertheless be
lawful.44
Professor Yoram Dinstein argues that “[p]ursuant to the
Charter, the Security Council—and the Security Council alone—is
legally competent to undertake or to authorize forcible ‘humanitarian

40

G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at 144.
Id.
42
Id. at art. 7; see also, DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 72.
43
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 7 (emphasis added); see also
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 71-72.
44
See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 72.
41
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intervention.’”45 Ironically, this ignores the fact that Chapter VII does
not provide for humanitarian intervention. Chapter VII does not confer
onto the Security Council the power to authorize force to prevent
massive human rights violations or to initiate regime change. Instead, it
empowers the Security Council to authorize, or compel, military
interventions in the cases of threats to peace, breaches of peace, and
acts of aggression—conflicts between states—but only so as to “restore
international peace and security.”46 This grant of authority is narrow. It
is Chapter VI, not VII, which vests the Security Council with broad
powers to address human rights violations internal to states but of
international concern.47 Chapter VI, however, addresses the “pacific”
settlement of conflicts and limits the Security Council’s powers of
addressing these matters to undertaking investigations and making
recommendations.48 Nothing in Chapter VI speaks to the authorization
of force. When writers like Dinstein argue that the only lawful form of
humanitarian intervention is that which is enforced under a Chapter VII
mandate, they have already read into the Charter an exception to
Article 2(4).49 This interpretation of Chapter VII is fully warranted,
however, because it gives effect to the principals and purposes of the
UN Charter.
Moreover, as Slye and Van Schaack note, “it is generally
accepted at the international level that treaties are to be treated as living
documents. In other words, they are to be interpreted in the context of
the time in which they are being applied, and not as they would have
been interpreted at the time of their drafting.” 50 The UN Charter must

45

Id. at 94. See also id. at 73 (Arguing that “[n]othing in the Charter of
the United Nations substantiates a unilateral right of one State to use
force against another under the guise of securing the implementation of
human rights”); SIMMA, supra note 12, at 131 (stating “Under the UN
Charter, forcible humanitarian intervention can no longer, therefore, be
considered lawful”).
46
U.N. Charter art. 39.
47
Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses the “pacific settlement of
disputes.” U.N. Charter art. 33.
48
U.N. Charter arts. 34, 36.
49
See note 43, infra.
50
RONALD C. SLYE AND BETH VAN SCHAACK, ESSENTIALS:
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2009); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 633 (7th ed., 2008)
(“[T]he language of the treaty must be interpreted in the light of the
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be read in light of state practice, contemporary notions of sovereignty
and opinio juris, such as that provided by the General Assembly with
the nascent Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P).51 The UN Charter,
in fact, anticipates the continued development of international law. The
Preamble provides that an additional purpose of the Charter is “to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained.”52 The R2P norm, which is one of those other sources,
having emerged in the last decades, holds that states have a
fundamental duty to protect their people from serious and systematic
human rights abuses.53 The General Assembly, offering strong evidence
of opinion juris, explained that, “each individual state has the
responsibility to protect [people] from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . through appropriate and
necessary means.”54 Pursuant to this doctrine, “if a state cannot or will
not prevent the occurrence of such abuses, then intervention by other
actors in the international community, including through the use of
force, is justified, subject to certain limitations.”55 Many states embrace
this principle. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,
which entered into force in 2001, provides that the Union has a “right . .
. to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity.”56 The “Assembly” noted in this provision is
rules of general international law in force at the time of its conclusion,
and also in the light of the contemporaneous meaning of terms.”).
51
See generally G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7,
2009); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or
Emerging Legal Norm, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 99 (2007); Int’l Comm’n on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,
2001, at 11; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶¶ 201-03, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004); G.A. Res. 60/2, ¶¶ 138-9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct.
24, 2005); Paul Williams and Michael Scharf, NATO Intervention on
Trial: The Legal Case that was Never Made, Human Rights Review
1(2): 103, at 105.
52
U.N. Charter pmbl.
53
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
54
Id.
55
Gillett, supra note 2, at 851.
56
Organization of African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union,
July 1, 2000, art. 4, ¶ h.
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composed of the heads of state of the African Union constituency, and
not the Security Council.57 Since the African Union Constitutive Act
evidently takes “due account of the Charter of the United Nations,” the
fifty-three African states which agreed to this document believe that
humanitarian intervention and R2P are compatible with the UN Charter
in the absence of a Security Council resolution.58
It must be conceded that the ICJ has held in several instances
that forcible humanitarian intervention, without Security Council
authorization is unlawful.59 In the Nicaragua case, the court held that
the use of force was not an appropriate means of addressing human
rights violations in the Central American state. 60 The ICJ further held in
the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that there were only two
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force: self-defense and that
pursuant to Ch. VII authorization.61 In the DRC case, the court noted
that despite the atrocities ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Uganda was not authorized to use military force within the
DRC.62 On the other hand, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo, the ICJ held that States are obligated “to employ all means
reasonably available to them so as to prevent genocide so far as
possible”63 The bona fide nature of the humanitarian interventions in
both Nicaragua and DRC were dubious. If a case were to come before
the World Court whose facts more strongly suggested the humanitarian
intervention was invoked in good faith, the ICJ might rule very
differently. Indeed, the ICJ had the opportunity to reiterate the
Id. at art. 1 (“‘Assembly’” means the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Union”).
58
See id. at pmbl, art. 3, (listing the heads of State adopting the
Constitutive Act in 2000).
59
Petty, supra note 31, at 121.
60
See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua,
Merits, Judgments (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 146-49 (June 27);
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 74 (citing N.S. Rodley, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INTL.
& COMP. L.Q. 321, 332 (1989)).
61
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227, 266 (July 8).
62
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures, 2000 I.C.J. 124-25 (July 1).
63
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 221, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26).
57
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(perceived) incompatibility of humanitarian intervention with the UN
Charter in the Kosovo advisory opinion and chose not to.64
Moreover, Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force must
be considered in light of state practice. In 1990, a West African
peacekeeping force—under the auspices of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS)—was militarily involved in Liberia
without Chapter VII Security Council authorization. 65 The UN did not
condemn the action and member states largely applauded the
intervention.66 The Security Council even adopted a resolution
commending the effort and affirming its support. 67 This favorable
treatment can be largely explained by the humanitarian purposes of the
intervention and the ongoing civil war in Liberia that was resulting in
large-scale human rights atrocities.68 ECOWAS again intervened in
Sierra Leone in 1997 without Chapter VII authorization, with much the
same result.69 Most notably, NATO bombed Yugoslavia for a period of
seventy-eight days in 1999 without a Security Council mandate, an
action unrelated to self-defense.70 The United States-led NATO
bombing of the former Yugoslavia was intended to protect the
repressed ethnic Albanian population in the Kosovo province from an
“overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”71 Again, the UN did not
64

See Accordance with International Law of Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,
2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22).
65
See generally Anthony Chukwuka Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS
Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 381 (1994).
66
Id.
67
See Kofi Oteng Kufour, Developments in the Resolution of the
Liberian Conflict, 10:1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 384, (1994);
see also S.C. Res. 788, ¶12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 18, 1992).
68
See generally REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS (M. Weller, ed.1994).
69
See generally Daniel Doktori, Minding the Gap: International Law
and Regional Enforcement in Sierra Leone, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 329
(2008).
70
BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 742.
71
As the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir
Jeremy Greenstock, put it in March 24th 1999: “The action being taken
is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances
in Kosovo there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is
imminent. . . Every means short of force has been tried to avert this
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condemn the campaign, though admittedly, it was not uncontroversial.72
State practice is actually much more consistent and widespread than
these few examples suggest. For example, Russia, one of the
archetypical states trumpeting the uncompromising language of Article
2(4), nonetheless invoked humanitarian intervention when it intervened

situation . . . military intervention is legally justifiable . . . .” quoted in
BROWNLIE, id. at 743; See also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1156 (6th ed.) (2008); UKMIL, 70 British Yearbook of
International Law, 1999, p. 586, where the UK Secretary of State for
Defense stated, “In international law, in exceptional circumstances and
to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, military action can be taken and it
is on that legal basis that military action was taken.”
72
See Mary E. O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is
Aggression? Comparing the Jus ad Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 189, 202-03 (2012) (referencing, Bruno Simma,
NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 1 (1999); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International
Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi,
‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002)); See also, SHAW,
supra note 71, at 1157; Gillett, supra note 2, at 851; BROWNLIE, supra
note 50, at 744 (noting a “Ministerial Declaration produced by the
meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77 held in New York on
24 September 1999, three months after the NATO action against
Yugoslavia had ended.” There, the “Ministers stressed the need to
maintain clear distinctions between humanitarian assistance and other
activities of the United Nations. They rejected the so-called right of
humanitarian intervention, which has no basis in the UN Charter or
international law.”). Id. at 744; See also DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at
338 (stating, the “[f]ailure by the Council to act in the face of ‘ethnic
cleansing’ in Kosovo was distressing. Still, the ‘cure’ for that failure –
opening the sluices for unilateral forcible intervention in a manner
wreaking havoc on the Charter’s system prohibiting the use of interState force save for self-defense or collective security – appears to the
present writer worse than the disease.” He further states that “[t]he
question whether the situation in Kosovo in 1999 was so agonizing hat
it warranted humanitarian intervention from the outside should have
been resolved by the Security Council and not unilaterally by
NATO.”).
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in Georgia in 2008.73 The fact that few observers would find this
conduct to be an example of bona fide humanitarian intervention does
nothing to refute the fact that even Russia believes unauthorized
humanitarian intervention may be lawful in some circumstances. Some
commentators worry that if humanitarian intervention is deemed lawful
it will be raised as a convenient excuse by states to advance their own
political agendas.74 “The pitfall,” Dinstein writes, in granting license to
unauthorized humanitarian intervention, “is that there can be
countervailing subjective opinions as to whether a course of action is
just, and there is too much room for abuse of the law in the name of
justice.”75 These concerns are valid. To address those concerns, the
international community and the court can apply rigorous guidelines
clarifying which forms of humanitarian intervention will be treated as
unlawful and which will not be, rather than sticking to the dogmatism
that Article 2(4) is absolute. More exacting guidelines, either offered
through judicial decisions of the court or through the Elements of
Crimes, on the meaning of “character” in Article 8 bis would be an
appropriate way of addressing these concerns (see below).
In sum, Article 2(4) must be interpreted so as not to
undermine the principles of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) cannot be
construed to prohibit bona fide humanitarian intervention necessary to
prevent massive human rights atrocities from being perpetrated. A state
cannot engage in massive human rights violations in contravention of
the UN Charter’s principles, and then, with unclean hands, invoke that
very same Charter to argue that its political independence and territorial
integrity–necessary to continue committing human rights atrocities–are
offended by humanitarian interveners. Nevertheless, this issue will
remain contentious, and for the purposes of the Rome Statute, the
complete contours of Article 2(4) need not be resolved here. Even if
accepting, arguendo, that UN Charter Article 2(4) cannot be
harmonized with humanitarian intervention, it does not mean that such
a use of force will constitute the crime of aggression. An act of
73

O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 206; see also Gregory
Hafkin, Russio-Georgian War of 2008: Developing the Law of
Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 28 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 219 (2010).
74
See, e.g., DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL AND
BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2nd ed.
2005); STEPHEN A. GARRETT, DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL: AN
EXAMINATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 3 (1999).
75
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 74.
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aggression—an illegal use of armed force—while a necessary
ingredient for the crime of aggression, is not sufficient to trigger the
ICC’s jurisdiction. The Rome Statute requires more.

III.

MANIFEST VIOLATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER

It may be superfluous to point out that the crime of aggression
requires an act of aggression. An act of aggression, however, is not
enough to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 8 bis.76 This
reflects the pedigree of the consensus definition found in Resolution
3314. Article 5(2) of that resolution states: “A war of aggression is a
crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international
responsibility.”77 The Resolution therefore differentiates “aggression”
on the one hand, which gives rise to international state responsibility,
and a “war of aggression” on the other, which is criminal. 78 The
General Assembly clearly signaled that not every act of aggression
should constitute a crime, even if one believes that all acts of
aggression violate the UN Charter. Acts of aggression that fall short of
wars of aggression will not result in individual criminal responsibility,
though they might trigger the rules of state responsibility (not dealt
with here).79
Where Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute defines the “crime
of aggression,” Article 8 bis(2) defines “act of aggression.” 80 The Rome
Statute, therefore, like the consensus definition, bifurcates crimes and
mere acts of aggression. Where Resolution 3314 delineates criminal
conduct and state responsibility, Article 8 bis distinguishes crimes
adjudicable by the Court and acts of aggression, which are beyond the
Court’s jurisdiction to punish.81 Since Article 8 bis(2) defines “act of
aggression” as a “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
Gillett, supra note 2, at 855
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at art. 5(2).
78
See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 135.
79
See generally Dinstein, supra note 37, at ¶ 12; DINSTEIN, supra note
16, at 135. For more on State responsibility, see also ILC Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC
GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, ILC A/56/10 (2011).
80
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8 bis(2).
81
See id., at art. 5 (The Court only has the competency to punish the
crimes listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. Article 5(d) speaks of the
crime of aggression, and does not contain a provision for acts of
aggression).
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territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” the
“crime of aggression” must be something different.82 Not all acts of
aggression will rise to the level of the crime of aggression. The dividing
line between acts and crimes of aggression is provided for in Article 8
bis.83 In order to constitute the crime of aggression under the Rome
Statute, “as a threshold requirement” the act of aggression must “by its
character, gravity and scale, constitute a manifest violation of the
Charter of the United Nations.”84
The terms in the threshold qualifier are catnip for lawyers.
They appear ambiguous at first and are (mostly) undefined in the Rome
Statute.85 Some commentators have expressed their dissatisfaction with
the qualifiers and plentiful ink has been spilled attempting to interpret
the language used in this provision.86 This section spills a little more
(“manifest” is discussed here, “character, gravity and scale” are dealt
with in order below). As the Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage acidly
puts it, “[t]he adjective ‘manifest’ often functions in suspect ways in
legal writing . . . This word is one of those vague terms by which
lawyers create an appearance of continuity, uniformity and definiteness
that does not in fact exist.”87 Before ultimately settling on “manifest,”
the drafters of Article 8 bis considered using “flagrant” or “serious” as
triggering thresholds.88 Reportedly, the reason “flagrant” was not
adopted is that it was believed the term would “establish a very high

Id.
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8 bis.
84
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: SECOND REVISED EDITION 636 (2013) (citing Rome Statute,
supra note 3, art. 8 bis).
85
See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486 (noting that the “[d]rafters did
not consider how these factors should be defined, leaving it to the Court
for interpretation”).
86
See e.g., O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 200; See G.A.
Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 3; See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra
note 72, at 204.
87
BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE, 547
(Oxford, 2nd ed. 1995).
88
See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204; see also,
Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression 6, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 2006.
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threshold, apparently too high.”89 “Manifest,” on the other hand, was
thought to establish a threshold higher than that found in Resolution
3314, but not too high. 90 Nomenclature is a lawyer’s stock-in-trade, but
there is probably no real difference between “flagrant” and “manifest.”
According to the Burton Legal Thesaurus, the two words are
synonymous.91
At the Kampala Review Conference, some delegations wished
to define “manifest violations” as “an obvious illegal violation.”92 Other
delegations interpreted the phrase to mean “a violation with serious
consequences.”93 A third group interpreted “manifest” to mean that the
violation must be both obviously illegal and one with serious
consequences.94 No interpretation was agreed upon, but commentators
have put forward various suggestions for the meaning of “manifest.” 95
In an attempt to define the terms, Paulus refers to the Oxford English
Dictionary, which notes that manifest is “clearly revealed to the eye,
mind or judgment; open to view or comprehension; obvious.” 96 He goes
on to state that this definition is of not much help in that, “what, after
all is obvious for one, is completely obscure to the other, in particular
in international law.”97 Echoing that sentiment, Potter suggests that
“manifest” adds nothing to the definition of the crime “but confusion.” 98
89

O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204 (quoting Stefan
Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group
on the Crime of Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 621-43
(Roberto Bellelli, ed., 2010).
90
Id.
91
See WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS, 325, (Steven C.
DeCosta, ed., Deluxe ed., 1980).
92
See Johan D. der Vyver, Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the
International Criminal Court, 1 NAT'L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L.
REV. 1, 27 (2010-2011).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See, e.g., Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of
Aggression, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1117 (2009); Drew Kostic, Whose
Crime is it Anyway? The International Criminal Court and the Crime
of Aggression, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (2011-2012);
O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72.
96
Paulus, supra note 95, at 1121.
97
Id.
98
O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204.
82

Journal of International Law

This is unpersuasive. There is a presumption in treaty
interpretation that the drafting parties did not intend ambiguity, and that
each word has been included for a reason.99 The reason the “manifest”
language was adopted was clearly to limit the scope of the crime of
aggression. At the Kampala Review Conference, several States leading
the effort to include the “manifest” qualifier were involved in NATO’s
1999 Kosovo campaign.100 Some delegates were concerned about the
crime of aggression’s potential chilling impact on humanitarian
interventions.101 It was, supposedly, the “elephant in the room.” 102 At
Kampala, the US delegation’s “single most sensitive proposal was on
excluding humanitarian intervention from the scope of draft Article 8
bis.”103 O’Connell and Niyazmatov note that other NATO States
supported a high threshold for individual criminal responsibility, and
that “[t]he delegations supporting the high threshold of ‘manifest’ by
‘character, gravity and scale’ were also those advocating that the ICC’s
jurisdiction over aggression be narrow.”104 No explicit exception for
humanitarian intervention was agreed upon, but the “manifest”
language was, and it must be read with the understanding that

99

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 726
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed.).
100
See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202-03.
101
Id. at 202-03 (referencing Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use
of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Mary Ellen
O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22
HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest
Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65
MOD. L. REV. 159-75 (2002)).
102
Gillett, supra note 2, at 846. See also O’Connell & Niyazmatov,
supra note 72, at 202 (“During the Preparatory Commission’s meeting
in 1996, the US representative had already expressed specific concerns
about humanitarian intervention. He tried to argue that because the
drafters of the UN Charter did not know about humanitarian
intervention, the ICC crime of aggression would have to specially
provide for it.”).
103
Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holzendorff, The Kampala Compromise
on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1205 (2010).
104
O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202-03.
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humanitarian intervention is the very sort of conduct the qualifier was
intended to exclude.105
There is textual support for this argument. Although the
“manifest” threshold is found in neither the UN Charter nor Resolution
3314, it is elaborated upon in the Vienna Convention. 106 Article 46(2) of
the Vienna Convention states that “a violation of domestic law can be
invoked as manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and
in good faith.”107 That provision is used in the context of the validity of
treaties, but the presumption is that terms should be used consistently
unless provided for otherwise.108 “Manifest” is also used in two other
locations of the Rome Statute.109 It is elaborated upon once. Rome
Statute Article 33 addresses the defense of obedience to superior
orders110. Subsection 2 explains that “orders to commit genocide or
crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.”111 This language is
“[f]or the purposes of [Article 33]” 112, but this is simply an
105

The American delegation attempted unsuccessfully to have the
following understanding explicitly exclude humanitarian intervention
adopted at Kampala:
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an
act cannot be considered to be a manifest violation of
the United Nations Charter unless it would be
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in
the matter in accordance with normal practice and in
good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection
with an effort to prevent the commission of any of
the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the
Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.

See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 483.
See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 726.
107
VCLT, supra note 9, art. 46(2) at 343. (emphasis added). See also
id.
108
VCLT, supra note 9, art. 46 at 343; see also, id. at art. 31(1) at 340
(“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
109
Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 33(1)(c)(2), 85(3).
110
Id. art. 33.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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acknowledgement that such orders can never reasonably be interpreted
as lawful.113 “Manifest” is used here as a reasonableness standard and
there is no indication that it should be used any differently in Article 8
bis.114 In fact, the Elements of Crimes, adopted contemporaneously with
Article 8 bis, states: “The term ‘manifest’ is an objective
qualification.”115 Objectivity is applied by the reasonableness standard:
what a typical person in the actor’s circumstance would understand to
be reasonable behavior is objectively reasonable as a matter of law.116
It is the position here that interpreting the UN Charter so as to
allow bona fide humanitarian intervention in the face of serious human
rights atrocities is reasonable, despite the lack of Security Council
authorization even if it is in technical violation. 117 If it is not a manifest
violation, it is not criminal.118 According to the late Cassese, “[t]he
requirement of ‘manifest’ violations of the UN Charter excludes
borderline or gray-area cases in an area of law with a lot of blurry
regions and focuses on conduct that warrants criminal
condemnation.”119 The “manifest threshold,” indicates that clearly not
all aggression will fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and thus the
threshold will filter out borderline cases.120 The “manifest violation”
qualifier should, in other words, be interpreted to exclude uses of force
For more on the reasonableness standard in an international criminal
law context, see Jessica Liang, Defending the Emergence of the
Superior Orders in the Contemporary Context,2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L
L. 871-891, 884 (2010).
114
Id.
115
The crime of aggression, RC/RES.6, Annex II, intro. ¶ 3 (June 11,
2010).
116
VCLT, supra note 9, at art 31.
117
ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, 139 (Oxford University Press 3rd ed., 2013).
118
Id.
119
Id.; See also February 2009: Final Meeting of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression Meeting, in THE PRINCETON
PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL
WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009, 51
(Stefan Barriga, et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE PRINCETON
PROCESS].
120
Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1, at ¶19
(5 Sept. 2006).
113
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from the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction, which facially violate the
UN Charter, but nonetheless comport with its principles and purposes.
The reader need not yet be convinced. Even if humanitarian
intervention is a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and even if
humanitarian intervention is a “manifest violation” of the Charter, it is
still not necessarily the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute.
This is because Article 8 bis further qualifies “manifest” by requiring
the act of aggression to have a “character, gravity and scale” which
makes it a manifest violation. 121 These parameters are specific and set a
high threshold for individual criminal culpability.122 Specifically, it is
not any manifest violation, but only violations which are manifest
because of their “character, gravity and scale 123” that are crimes of
aggression under the Rome Statute. Thus, to determine whether an
aggressive act is both a “manifest violation” and criminal, one must
first define these other qualifiers and apply them accordingly. As we
will see, a reasonable interpretation of these qualifiers will exclude
humanitarian interventions.
Before interpreting the qualifiers, the issue of which
combination of the qualifiers need be satisfied must first be addressed.
At Kampala, Understanding No. 7, intended to aid the Court in
interpreting Article 8 bis, was adopted by resolution. 124 Understanding
No. 7 provides that, [i]n establishing whether an act of aggression
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations,
the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient
to justify a 'manifest' determination. “No one component can be
significant enough” to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.125 This
Understanding reflects the view that prosecutions at the ICC for the
crime of aggression will be confined to only the most serious and
dangerous armed interventions. Yet Understanding No. 7 also adds a
degree of confusion.126 A plain, “strictly grammatical reading” of
121

Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8(1).
See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 136.
123
Rome Statute, supra note 3 at art. 8(1).
124
See generally David Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression
Under the Rome Statute, 43 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 173, 179
(2011).
125
Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Annex III; See also BARRIGA, supra
note 89, at 629.
126
See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 728 (suggesting that the new Rome
Statute provision “actually might have been more easily interpreted
without [the Understandings]”).
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Article 8 bis(1) would require all three qualifiers to be satisfied. 127 The
qualifiers are written conjunctively. Understanding No. 7, however,
suggests only two metrics need to be met. Rather than limit Article 8
bis as the United States intended, Understanding No. 7 may actually
expand it.128 Further, the Understanding erroneously refers to an act of
aggression, but Article 8 bis(2)—defining acts of aggression—does not
require any determination of “manifest violation” or of satisfaction of
the three qualifiers. Those requirements deal with the crime of
aggression and are contained in Article 8 bis(1), where, as Schafer
notes, “there already exists the triple-hitter standard of ‘character,
gravity, and scale’ . . . .”129 Simply, Understanding No. 7 refers to the
wrong section of Article 8.
The Court could simply disregard Understanding No. 7 as
being patently erroneous. Elsewhere, however, the ICC has read “and”
in the Rome Statute to mean “or” and could do so again even if it
disregards the Understanding.130 Regardless of whether the Court will
read Article 8 bis as requiring all three metrics to be satisfied or just
some combination of two, humanitarian intervention should be
excluded from the crime of aggression. 131 The most logical
interpretation of both character and gravity will exclude humanitarian
interventions from constituting manifest violations of the UN Charter. 132

Scheffer, supra note 124, at 179.
Scheffer concludes that it is doubtful that the ICC judges will create
any such magnitude standard anyway based on the erroneous
formulation of Understanding No. 7. The simple fact is, “the Rome
Statute, as amended, requires no such determination for ‘acts of
aggression,’” but only for the crime of aggression. See id. at 180; See
also, Heinsch, supra note 3, at 729.
129
Scheffer, supra note 124, at 179.
130
For example, article 30 of the Rome Statute states that “Unless
otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”
(emphasis added) There is little doubt that the Court interprets this
“and” as “or.” Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 30.
131
Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 484.
132
See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 95, at 1120.
127
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A. Character
Resolution 3314 does not use the term “character” to
differentiate between acts of aggression or crimes of aggression, nor for
any other purpose.133. “Character” is not defined in Article 8 bis.
Consequently, Paulus has suggested that the term is so indeterminate as
to be “almost meaningless.”134 This author respectfully disagrees. As
one of three qualifiers it is self-evident that “character” must mean
something other than “gravity” and “scale”. The term suggests a
qualitative analysis as opposed to quantitative. 135 A good faith
interpretation of the “character” qualifier will exempt uses of force that
may be found to be technical acts of aggression or unlawful uses of
force, but which are executed for laudable motives. This qualifier could
be the acid test for distinguishing between bona fide unilateral
humanitarian intervention and criminal aggression masquerading as
humanitarianism.
The “character” qualifier provides an opportunity for the
Court to apply the crime of aggression flexibly enough to exclude bona
fide but unauthorized humanitarian intervention. The relevant character
of an act of aggression should be construed as its motive. In other
words, the motive of humanitarian intervention affects the character of
aggression. As Van Schaack notes, the term “character” is “elastic” and
provides “an opening to argue that an act of aggression was not
committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes.” 136 The
German delegation to the Preparatory Committee highlighted the
relevance of intent.137 The importance of intent in aggression has been
recognized by scholars.138 Glaser, for example, argues that there must
133

See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486.
Paulus, supra note 95, at 1121.
135
Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486.
136
Id.
137
Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Court,
Proposals for Definition of the War Crime Aggression, 5th Sess.,
Dec.1-12, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997 (Dec. 11, 1997).
138
See, e.g., Elise Leclerc-Gagné & Michael Byers, A Question of
Intent: The Crime of Aggression and Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 381 (2009); Michael P.
Scharf et al., Rep. of Cleveland Experts Meeting: The Int’l Criminal
Court and the Crime of Aggression 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 436
(2009) (citing reports of the Spec. Comm. in U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev. 1 (1968)); U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No.
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be a special intent (an aggressive purpose) for the crime of aggression
to attach in customary international law.139 Under this view, a military
incursion for the sole purpose of humanitarian intervention would not
constitute aggression.140 Cassese initially disagreed and argued that
customary international law prohibits aggression regardless of motive,
but later changed his view to agree with Glaser.141 Although a specific
intent is not explicitly provided for in the definition of the crime in
Article 8 bis, a specific intent element is arguably implicated by the
“character” qualifier. Reaching the same result by a different
interpretive technique, Gillett suggests “the aggression provisions could
be read to import an implicit negative element, whereby the
Prosecution must prove the absence of a legal justification for the use
of armed force.”142 In other words, the Court could shift the burden to
the prosecution.143
If the Court interprets “character” differently, motive could
still be raised as a defense once the Court has determined it has
jurisdiction over humanitarian interventions. The Court is empowered
with the ability to entertain a defense of motive, for example, as part of
a defense based on lack of mens rea. Article 31(3) of the Rome Statute
provides that “At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding
criminal responsibility other than those [specifically provided for in the
Rome Statute] where such a ground is derived from [international]
law.”144 Motive can play a role in international crimes. 145 This provision
of the Rome Statute “opens the possibility of uncodified defenses being

20, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (Feb. 14, 1970); U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8019 (July 13–Aug. 14, 1970); U.N. GAOR, 26th
Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8419 (Feb. 1-Mar. 5, 1971); U.N.
GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8719 (Jan. 31–Mar. 3,
1972).
139
Jens Ohlin, Aggression, in The Oxford Companion to International
Criminal Justice 238 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
140
Id.
141
Id. (referencing Antonio Cassese, On some Problematical Aspects of
the Crime of Aggression, 20 LJIL (2007) 841-849).
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See id.
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considered by the Court.”146 It is to be read broadly. As Eser notes,
“defenses” denote “all grounds which, for one reason or another, hinder
the sanctioning of an offence – despite the fact that the offence has
fulfilled all definitional elements of a crime.” 147 Schabas concludes that
Article 31(1) “provides the Court with a relatively free hand to consider
other defenses, to the extent that they have some basis in the sources of
applicable law,” so long as the provision’s procedural rules are
complied with.148 Such a ground could be a motive related to a use of
force, which causes less harm than that anticipated by inaction.149

B. Gravity
A threshold requirement is not something new to international
criminal law, or even to the Rome Statute. 150 Crimes against humanity
and war crimes both contain threshold requirements. Crimes against
humanity must be “widespread and systematic.” 151 War crimes must
constitute a “serious infringement.” 152 Similarly, the Geneva
Conventions contain the “grave breaches” standard for criminal
responsibility.153 Both Resolution 3314 and the UN Charter envision a
146

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 484 (Oxford University Press
2010).
147
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WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 251, 251 (Yoram Dinstein and
Mala Tabory eds., 1996).).
148
Id. at 492 (discussing the procedures relating to Rule 80 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence in accordance with article 31(3)).
149
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 31(3). Article 31(3) allows the
Court to exclude criminal responsibility if the conduct is permissible
under applicable law. That applicable law could be R2P.
150
See generally Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity
Threshold of the International Criminal Court, 23 AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY INT’L. LAW REV. 807, 807 (2008).
151
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.
152
Id. art. 8.
153
See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 727 (noting that “not all violations of
international humanitarian law entail individual criminal responsibility
but only those listed in the respective articles of the Geneva
Conventions or Additional protocol I”); see also Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
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“continuum of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the
level of aggression.”154 Resolution 3314 provides a further example in
this respect: in order to determine whether a sanctionable act of
aggression has occurred, the Security Council may “conclude that such
a determination would not be justified in the light of other relevant
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their
consequences are not of sufficient gravity.” 155 “Gravity” as a threshold
matter represents nothing new.
This qualifier could be read either as a quantitative measure of
the kinetic potency of the use of force, or as qualitative consideration of
the seriousness of a legal infraction.156 Van Schaack suggests it is the
former.157 She writes that “gravity” refers to the “severity, magnitude,
and consequences of a particular use of force.”158 That is how the World
Court has used the term. The “gravity” metric traces its roots to dicta
from the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment (and the Oil Platforms case).159 In
Nicaragua, the ICJ alluded to “measures which do not constitute an
armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force.”160 The ICJ
found it “necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of
force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave
forms.”161 The World Court further explained that an armed attack
Condition of the Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; See also Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; See also Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 art. 85, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
154
Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 483.
155
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 2.
156
Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486 (for a suggestion that
consequences are qualitative).
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 195, 247, 249, (Nov. 26); Oil
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 62, 72
(Nov. 6); See also DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 136.
160
Nicar., supra note 159, at ¶ 210; see also, DINSTEIN, supra note
16, at 208.
161
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 208.
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differed from “a mere frontier incident,” inasmuch as an armed attack
must have sufficient “scale and effects.”162 Similarly, in determining the
scope of “gravity,” the office of the prosecutor, which at the time was
directed by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, reasoned that several factors must
be considered: “the number of persons killed, number of victims of
other crimes, especially crimes against physical integrity and the
impact of the crimes.”163 “Gravity” in this sense is a quantitative metric
of the scale of force employed, and therefore incorporates the
distinction of acts of aggression that warrant close international
scrutiny from less significant uses of force.
This is arguably not the correct application of the gravity
qualifier in Article 8 bis. Quantitative measurements are already
captured by the scale metric, which is discussed below. In fact, the ICJ
used the same terminology (“systematic” and “large scale”) to explain
“scale” in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(Application for Warrants of Arrest).164 Logically, “gravity” here must
162

Id. at 210. (Dinstein points out that “The assumption that ‘a mere
frontier incident’ can have no ‘scale and effects’ is quite bothersome.)
163
LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL
ADVISORS OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6 (2005),
available at
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/speeches/LM
O_20051024_English.pdf. (Although it is arguably not the Prosecutor’s
prerogative to be interpreting the Rome Statute the Pre-Trial chamber
in Lubanga did limit the scope of “gravity” by requiring the conduct to
be either “systematic” or “large scale.” Pre Trial Chamber, The
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 29, January
2007 at 46).
164
See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07, Application for Warrants of
Arrest, ¶ 64 (Feb. 10, 2006); but see Situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Appeal of Case No.
ICC-01/04-125-Us-Exp, ¶ 82 (July 13, 2006) (noting that this definition
of gravity is flawed, albeit in obiter dicta); see also MORENOOCAMPO, supra note 163, at 6 (stating, “We are currently in the
process of refining our methodologies for assessing gravity. In
particular, there are several factors that must be considered. The most
obvious of these is the number of persons killed – as this tends to be the
most reliably reported. However, we will not necessarily limit our
investigations to situations where killing has been the predominant
crime. We also look at number of victims of other crimes, especially
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mean something different than systematic, widespread, or large scale.
Interpreting Article 8 bis to exclude legal grey areas or de minimus
infractions of the UN Charter would be in conformity with a number of
provisions of the Rome Statue. Article 5(1), for example, provides that
“[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” 165 The
Preamble has a similar provision. 166 This reflects the language of
Resolution 3314, which provides that aggression is “the most serious
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force.”167 Echoing this, the U.S.
was successful in obtaining the following Understanding at Kampala:
It is understood that aggression is the most serious
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and
that a determination whether an act of aggression has
been committed requires consideration of all the
circumstances of each particular case, including the
gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences,
in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.168
By signaling out “gravity” the Understanding seems to elevate its
significance above character and scale.
The “gravity” metric should be used, therefore, as an analysis
of the degree to which a use of force is unlawful. If humanitarian
interventions are deemed violative of the UN Charter, the question
crimes against physical integrity. The impact of the crimes is another
important factor.”).
165
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at pmbl. (“Affirming that the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
must not go unpunished…”); see also id. art. 66(3) (which requires the
Court to be “convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.”).
166
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167
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2010; Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression, 13th plenary
meeting, June 11, 2010; see Resolution RC/Res.6, June 28,
2010, Annex III, ¶ 7; see Depositary Notification, Nov. 29, 2010,
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becomes: how grave is the violation? This interpretation of gravity—
the seriousness of a legal breach—is how it is used elsewhere in the
Rome Statute. Article 17(d) requires the Pre-trial Chamber, when
assessing admissibility of a case, to ensure that those before the Court
are of “sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court.” 169 The
prosecutor is also required to make such a determination before
initiating investigations.170 Although reading article 17(d) and the
“gravity” metric together could appear to create a redundancy, this is
not the case. There are two separate gravity tests here, but that does not
militate in construing “gravity” in Article 8 bis any differently than as it
is used in Article 17(d). The tests are not duplicative. The “gravity” of
the use of force, measured to determine if the crime of aggression is
punishable, is higher than the gravity of the situation necessary to
warrant the Court’s attention and resources as a general matter. A
corollary of this is that the gravity test cannot be lower than the Court’s
general threshold for hearing only highly important cases, and it cannot
be the same standard. The “gravity” qualifier should be employed to
exclude the malum prohibitum infractions of the UN Charter, which are
not malum in se (for example, humanitarian interventions).

C. Scale
The scale metric is quantitative. It can also be traced to the
Nicaragua case, where, as noted above, the ICJ held that a use of force
must have some “scale and effects” to constitute an armed attack for
the purposes of the UN Charter.171 Dinstein notes that there is “no doubt
that minor acts of aggression – even if enumerated in Paragraph 2 [of 8
bis] – would not pass muster as crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court.”172 In other words, the acts may be patently unlawful, but they
are qualitatively insignificant enough to (judicially) ignore. There is
169

Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17 (Clearly, the question is whether
the case is important enough to warrant the Court’s attention. After
all, a nuclear detonation which violates a crime will be important
enough for the Court’s attention even though it is a one-time event
and not widespread.).
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sufficient authority to confidently posit that relatively minor uses of
force—for example, a warning shot across the bow of a ship or the
rescue of nationals abroad from airplane hijackers—do not even violate
Article 2(4).173 The “scale” metric recognizes this and makes its
satisfaction an explicit requirement for an act of aggression to be a
crime under the Rome Statute. Any humanitarian intervention
substantial enough to curb atrocities will probably be of a “scale”
sufficient to trigger this metric.174 This qualifier will not exclude
humanitarian interventions but it is important, again, to note that both
“gravity” and “scale” cannot be read to mean the same thing. “Scale”
clearly refers to the level of force used, either in an individual armed
attack or in aggregate, and so gravity must mean something different:
an analysis how significantly a use of force is a violation of the UN
Charter.

IV.

NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE

Following the adoption of the ICC’s definition of the crime of
aggression, the New York Times ran an editorial that posited, “What
constitutes a ‘manifest’ violation of the charter? The truth is it’s
impossible to say.”175 The Times editorial is at least partially correct,
173

Id. (referencing, MARY E. O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 229-230 (Oxford
University Press, 2011). O’Connell and Niyazmatov suggest “there is
sufficient authority to conclude that ‘minor’ uses of force, including
rescue of nationals involving minor force, are not even violations of
Article 2(4), let alone serious violations amounting to aggression.”
They point out that: “State practice and decisions of the ICJ indicate
that some inter-state uses of force might violate the
principle of non-intervention or constitute unlawful countermeasures
but do not come within the prohibition of Art. 2(4). Police-type
operations used to arrest pirates, to stop a vessel by shooting across
the bow, or to rescue hostages, for example, may involve the use of
force but are treated as too minimal to come within Art. 2(4). Art. 2(4)
prohibits armed force of more than a minor or de minimis nature . . .
As discussed above, if a use of force does not violate Art. 2(4), it is not
aggression. Even a violation of Art. 2(4) will not constitute aggression
if it is too minor. Aggression is a serious violation of Art. 2(4).”
174
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175
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and ultimately we won’t know the meaning of “manifest” or “character,
gravity, and scale” until the judges at the ICC tell us what they mean.
After all, only they can interpret the Rome Statute. 176 Murphy has
criticized the ICC’s aggression definition because it provides no real
guideposts for what the qualifiers require. 177 Hence, the Rome Statute
suffers “from considerable indeterminacy on a central issue.”178 It
would seem that in selecting such an ambiguous term, the drafters of
Article 8 bis have vested the judges at the Court with broad discretion
in interpreting the crime of aggression. But their discretion is not
unfettered. If and when they do interpret the definition of the crime of
aggression, they will be bound by the rule of nullum crimen sine lege.179
This is “a fundamental principle of justice that applies to all criminal
law systems, [and] requires that the penal law be clear and easily
ascertained, and thus provide adequate notice to individuals that certain
conduct may result in criminal liability.” 180 As Schabas notes, the
“canon of strict construction of penal law is a corollary of the principle
of legality. Ambiguity or doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
accused: in dubio pro reo.”181 The nullum crimen sine lege principle
was codified in the Rome Statute in order to “reassure States as to the
moderation with which the Court will interpret its Statute.” 182 Pursuant
to Article 22(2), “[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed,”
and “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.” 183
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176
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SCHABAS, supra note 140, at 410 (referring to Rome Statute article
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182
Id. at 723.
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Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute will apply to Article 8 bis,
and the qualifiers must be interpreted accordingly.184 Answering what
activity would be a manifest violation in terms of Article 8 bis at this
point is speculative, and therefore works in favor of a narrow reading—
one which excludes humanitarian interventions. Dinstein notes that “the
penumbra of uncertainty, which is characteristic of some segments of
the contemporary jus ad bellum, should not be exaggerated.”185 Shaw
similarly suggests “the right of individual states to intervene by force in
the territory of other states” pursuant to R2P and humanitarian
intervention is ambiguous.186 The adjective ambiguous is an antonym
of manifest.187 It follows then that even if an aggressive act purporting
in good faith to be lawful as a matter of R2P or humanitarian
intervention violates the UN Charter, it is by Shaw’s use of
terminology, not going to be a manifestly clear violation sufficient to
trigger individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute.

V.

CONCLUSION

This article has shown that bona fide humanitarian
intervention is not per se prohibited by the UN Charter, and therefore
will not necessarily be a violation of Article 2(4). That is not to say that
humanitarian intervention is affirmatively authorized, but rather ultra
vires. This is all that must be shown. Even if humanitarian intervention
is found to facially violate the UN Charter, however, it will not be a
manifest violation because bona fide humanitarian intervention
comports with the Charter’s principles. Even if it is found to be a
manifest violation, however, a humanitarian intervention will not have
the specific character and gravity necessary to be the punishable under
Article 8 bis. This is so regardless of whether the Court interprets the
qualifiers disjunctively or conjunctively (as shown above, both
character and gravity can be understood to exclude humanitarian
Gombo, when it construed Article 30’s dolus eventualis (recklessness)
exclusion. Id. at 410, (referencing Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/09),
Decision Pursuant to Article 71(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶
369).
184
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186
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187
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interventions). Under each of these arguments, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to punish an individual for the crime of aggression. The
Court need only accept one of these arguments for its jurisdiction to
fail.
To some extent, the debate on the crime of aggression is
largely academic. The Court still does not have the power to try this
crime and may not for a long time.188 But the power of Article 8 bis lays
in its ability to create the normative assumption that humanitarian
intervention is not lawful, but criminal. If bona fide humanitarian
intervention used as a last resort to protect fundamental human rights is
deemed criminal, it would, as Simma puts it, create a split “between
law and morality.”189 Even while arguing that humanitarian intervention
is not provided for in customary international law, Simma notes that
“[i]t becomes more and more intolerable to see grave violations of
human rights within a State and to see other States being banned by
public international law from intervening . . .”190
It would be self-immolating to construe the Rome Statute in
such a way that it undermines human rights by chilling humanitarian
intervention. In interpreting the Rome Statute, the judges at the ICC
would be wise to heed the admonishment leveled at young medical
students to “first, do no harm.”191 Van Schaack is correct when she says
that a broad interpretation of Article 8 bis “may result in more ex post
prosecutions of leaders launching aggressive campaigns at the expense
of ex ante efforts to halt threatened or ongoing violence.” 192 Without an
interpretation of the crime of aggression that excludes humanitarian
intervention, there exists a potential to “chill arguably beneficent uses
of force.”193 Because bona fide humanitarian intervention advances few
See supra text accompanying note 3.
SIMMA, supra note 12, at 131-132.
190
Id.
191
See generally FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND
HEALTHCARE (Sheila A. M. McLean ed., 2006) (examining patients’
rights and medical practitioners’ duties in observance of those rights,
balanced by a duty to meet statutory requirements in the medical field).
192
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or only abstract national interests for the intervening state, they are the
most likely forms of force to be chilled. Already states are not
“chomping at the bit to intervene in support of human rights.” 194 Lest
we forget, “even in the face of a horrific genocide, the international
community found a host of excuses for not intervening more robustly
in Rwanda. The codification of a crime of aggression without any
humanitarian exception provides one more excuse for inaction in the
face of atrocities.”195 When the law protects states engaging in massive
human rights abuses by criminalizing what may be the only remedy
available, the law has failed. Fortunately, as has been shown, it is
perfectly possible to interpret the UN Charter so as not to prohibit
humanitarian intervention, and for Article 8 bis not to criminalize it. A
contrary interpretation of these provisions would only strengthen the
hand of states engaging in massive human rights violations and would
undermine the very principles the ICC and the UN system seek to
uphold.
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